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Abstract
We examine strategic biases in the international regulation of monopolis-
tic or oligopolistic industries, where a minimum vertical quality standard
is imposed on a classical monopoly or duopoly, to correct an undersup-
ply of quality. This di¤ers from Hotelling-based studies, where the aim
of minimum quality standards is to correct excessive product di¤erenti-
ation. It also allows examination of unbalanced trade, not considered in
previous work. Noncooperative regulators tend to overregulate for prot-
shifting reasons, though only when producers can vary standards across
countries. However, even in this latter case, mutual recognition is only
unambiguously welfare-improving when trade is balanced, and it reduces
trade ows when quality is taken into account.
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1 Introduction
National standards and regulations1 on safety, reliability, or health and environmen-
tal grounds underlie many recent trade disputes. There have been disputes over
testing and labelling, over the safety of new technologies and over information dis-
closure and compatibility - for example, the recent stand-o¤ between the European
Union and United States over genetically modied foodstu¤s, as well as that over Mi-
crosofts software. In response to comparable problems in the past between member
states, the EU Single Market initiative has largely concentrated on removing tech-
nical barriers to trade (TBTs),2 and there have been similar agreements elsewhere
(Maskus and Wilson (eds., 2001)).
Liberalising regulations is not straightforward, since they often have a legitimate
objective, as acknowledged by the World Trade Organization (1995):
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared,
adopted or applied with a view to or with the e¤ect of creating unnecessary
obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations
shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to full a legitimate
objective....
- WTO Agreement Annex on Technical Barriers to Trade Article 2
[1995].3
While the existence of national regulations usually has a legitimate justication,
it has long been recognised that their implementation may create TBTs. What is
perhaps less well-recognised is that, even when trade is not impeded, regulations may
be strategically biased: for example, foreign suppliers may be made to provide higher-
than-optimal quality goods. This kind of bias - with strong parallels to the Brander-
Spencer prot-shifting literature (e.g. Brander and Spencer (1985)) - reduces overall
welfare, but is not necessarily trade-reducing.
In this paper, we investigate strategic biases in regulating a monopolistic or
oligopolistic industry, where there is a foreign-owned rm. In particular, we compare
noncooperative national standard-setting, on the lines of the WTOs national treat-
1Strictly speaking, regulationsare applied by governments and standardsare
voluntarily agreed by industries (Sykes (1995)). We concentrate on the former.
2One EU report in 1996 estimated that 76% of trade between member states was
subject to standards, and sectors a¤ected by regulatory trade barriers accounted for
21% of trade and 29% of gross value added (reported in OECD [1999]).
3Available on http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/tbt_01_e.htm#article2
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ment4 with a system of mutual recognition, as favoured by the European Unions
New Approach. Under both sets of rules, there are potential strategic biases, though
these di¤er, as in the former approach standards are e¤ectively set by the importing
country, while in the latter they are set by the exporting country.
Under a classical monopoly or oligopoly model (Sheshinski (1976)), the primary
legitimatemotivation for a minimum standard is to correct undersupply of quality.
The ways in which producers can raise prots by restricting both the quantity and
quality of output are numerous - particularly where we take a broad denition of
quality. For example, these could include lack of testing and labelling or use of
technological incompatibilities to tie in users to one rms products. A case in point
is the lobbying against genetic modication (GM) of foodstu¤s. The response of
governments to these will, however, depend upon the geographical structure of the
industry: with GM technology, US rms currently tend to dominate. It should
be no surprise that European legislators have taken a stricter line than those in
North America (Sturm, 2006), leading to a major trade dispute, notably over the
separate labelling of GM foodstu¤s. It is likely, if higher labelling standards prevail,
that trade will be higher in value terms than if they do not, and that this would
benet consumer welfare, though at a cost to prots.5 A comparable case is the
current antitrust dispute, in which the EU Commission is arguing for much greater
disclosure of proprietory information compared to what Microsoft had agreed with US
authorities. This would increase compatibility with non-Microsoft products, hence
beneting consumers.
More common, however, may be industries where trade is in both directions, such
as aircraft, motor vehicles, food products etc. In these cases, the recent literature
(e.g. Boom (1995), or Lutz (1996)) would suggest a bias towards over-regulation
under national treatment. However, a couple of cautions are needed. First, we need
to distinguish between trade volumes adjusted or unadjusted for quality (the issue of
aggregating Mercedes and Skodas): regulations may actually increase trade volumes
(or reduce the risk of consumer scares) when adjusted for quality, though at a cost
to manufacturers.
The second caution is that the ability of producers to vary the quality of their
product across di¤erent markets can have important implications for the welfare
4National Treatment allows countries to set standards for all goods sold in their
own market, but they may not set explicitly di¤erent standards for foreign goods.
5Nielsen and Anderson [2001] look at one scenario where some of the EU consumer
demand is sensitive, but they do not link this to utility, or to the values of traded
goods (which tally with utility), which may explain their rather negative assessment
of EU policy.
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comparison of various standard-setting games. This is examined in our paper.
The Boom (1995) or Lutz (1996) studies (among others) were based on the Shaked
and Sutton (1982) setup, which represents product di¤erentiation spatially, and
where the main motivation for regulation is to correct excessive product di¤eren-
tiation. By contrast, this paper uses a classical Cournot setup, where a minimum
standard is applied primarily to stop monopoly or oligopoly suppliers undersupply-
ing quality. Nevertheless, if standards can be varied costlessly across countries, there
are some strong parallels with the previous studies: there is strategic bias towards
overregulation of foreign rms in both models. However, using the classical setup
makes it clear that regulations are trade-increasing.6 A move from national treat-
ment to mutual recognition may be trade-decreasing (though trade remains above
its unregulated level). Secondly, while mutual recognition (MR) is a clear improve-
ment on national treatment (NT) in the case of balanced trade, the welfare e¤ects
when production is concentrated in one country (so that trade is unbalanced) are
more ambiguous, with the exporting country gaining from a move to MR, while the
importing country loses. Overall global welfare increases in some cases and decreases
in others.
The alternative case is where rms cannot vary quality standards across markets.
This changes results substantially: in fact, remarkably, there is no longer overregula-
tion of a cross-hauling duopoly under NT - instead, standards are automatically set
at globally optimal levels. Mutual recognition in this case reduces welfare.
Where there is a monopolist, situated in one country and exporting to the other,
and quality is inexible, the result of national treatment is a bargaining game between
the two regulators, with the exporting country trying to lower standards and the
importing country trying to raise them. Simulations based upon Nash bargaining
with equal weights suggest that the exporting country would gain at the expense of
the importing country from the introduction of MR, with a (mostly small) gain to
overall global welfare.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 sets up a model of vertical
quality regulation of a monopoly, and considers the impact of mutual recognition
in this unbalanced trade context. Section 3 extends the model to a cross-hauling,
Cournot duopoly, while Section 4 examines regulatory standard-setting with mutual
recognition and balanced trade. Section 5 examines how these results are a¤ected
where it is prohibitively costly for rms to produce at di¤erent standards for the
two markets. Section 6 looks at pure horizontal protection. Section 7 compares the
results with previous studies, and Section 8 concludes.
6This agrees with Swann et als (1996) empirical nding that increasing numbers
of national standards are correlated with increasing trade.
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2 A model of vertical quality regulation
Regulatory di¤erences can be horizontal or vertical. The former impose di¤erent
technologies or incompatible means of achieving a given set of results, such as plug
sizes. The latter are where a regulator clearly insists that goods achieve at least a
certain minimum standard of safety or performance. In this paper, we concentrate
on the vertical type of regulation. We start with a monopoly case, partly because it
is simpler, but also because it has relevance to the case of unbalanced trade, where
one country exports a good and the other imports it. Subsequently, we extend the
model to a cross-hauling duopoly.
2.1 Basic assumptions in the monopoly case
We start with the case of a single good, g, in a country with identical consumers and
a monopoly producer, who may be domestic or foreign. Output has two features:
quality, Q, and quantity, Y , both of which contribute to consumer utility. Because
this is a partial equilibrium framework, prices of other goods and incomes are held
constant. The consumer gains a direct utility from consuming good g, U(Q; Y ),
in turn yielding consumer surplus V , which will equal U(Q; Y )  Y P y, where Py is
the price per unit Y . Functions are continuous and di¤erentiable, with the usual
convexity assumptions, so that fU 0(Q); U 0(Y )g > 0; fU 00(Q); U 00(Y )g < 0. We also
assume diminishing marginal returns to consumption of good g. Both Q and Y are
produced subject to constant returns to scale: specically, we assume that the total
cost of production, C, is a linear function of Q and Y , with a scalar b for the relative
cost of increasing quality,
C = Y + bQ;
where the scalar on Y has been set to unity, without loss of generality.
It is helpful to rewrite this problem, by dening X = X(Y;Q) as a measure of
quality-adjusted output (henceforth q.a. output), which aggregates both qual-
ity and unadjusted output into a single measure. Utility can then be rewritten as
U = U(X); while one can view Y and Q as inputs into the production of X. Making
the additional restriction that U is homothetic in terms of Y and Q, we can choose
units of X such that it is produced subject to constant returns to scale. From these
assumptions, it follows that X is produced from Y and Q with diminishing mar-
ginal returns to substitution, while increasing X yields a positive but diminishing
marginal utility for the representative consumer.
Quality-adjusted output, X, represents a combination of unadjusted output, Y ,
and quality, Q, weighted such that utility can be expressed as a function of X alone.
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X(Q; Y ) is dened in units such that it is homogeneous of degree 1 in terms of Q
and Y .
The basic setup is shown in Figure 1, below. SinceX weightsQ and Y similarly to
how they are weighted in consumer utility, the isoquants forX in Figure 1 correspond
to indi¤erence curves for the consumer, as well as to various levels of prices expressed
per quality-adjusted unit, which we denote P (so that P = Y Py=X). A ray through
the origin links all the points at which the unit cost of producing X is minimised at a
constant C0. Moving outwards along this ray, U 0(X) is declining, so marginal revenue
also declines, thus determining the prot-maximising output level for a monopolist,
drawn at point A, where X = XU here. All other rays through the origin correspond
to alternative levels of unit cost, which increase as we move away from the C0 ray in
either direction.
Figure 1: Consumer indi¤erence curves and the e¤ect of a minimum regulatory
quality standard, QR, on quality and unadjusted quantity supplied.
Now assume that a regulator imposes a minimum quality standard, QR, which
exceeds the initial quality chosen by the unconstrained rm, QU . As a result, the
rm has to raise quality. If it were to keep its q.a. output, X, constant, then
moving to the new regulatory minimum quality would entail moving from A to B
on Figure 1. However, at point B, the marginal cost of increasing X is lower than
at A. Intuitively, we can see this, since, looking along the horizontal line for the
minimum quality standard, the higher the line, the more densely-packed are the
isoquants crossing it. This implies that a given increase in X can be achieved for
less additional input of Y . A consequence is that the rm will choose to increase its
q.a. output, moving horizontally from B to C, lowering average unit costs from C2
to C1.
More formally, we can derive the following conclusions:
Lemma 1 Imposing a minimum quality standard, QR; where QR > QU ; will
lower the marginal cost of increasing X.
Proof This follows since X is homogeneous of degree 1 in terms of Y and Q, and
there are diminishing marginal returns to substitution of Y for Q, which implies that
the marginal product of Y in terms of X will increase if Y=Q falls. Raising Q means
that the initial volume of X can be produced with a lower input of Y . Since we
assume X has a constant unit cost, raising @X=@Y implies a falling marginal cost of
producing X.7 (This is essentially an application of the envelope theorem): Q.E.D.
7Assuming a Cobb-Douglas/Isoelastic functional form, the proof can also be derived by di¤er-
entiating equation 1.7 in Appendix 1.
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Lemma 2 Raising the minimum quality standard will lead to monotonically in-
creasing quality-adjusted output, up to the point where the rm exits the market.
Proof This follows Lemma 1. Since marginal revenue is assumed to fall monoton-
ically as X rises, the level of X for which marginal revenue equals marginal cost will
increase as QR is raised. Q.E.D.
This situation is analogous to a more familiar problem, where a good is produced
with capital and labour. If the monopoly producer is constrained to employ more
capital than it would freely choose, it will respond by increasing output (which brings
its capital/labour ratio closer to the cost-minimising level). Nevertheless, prots are
reduced, due to the higher capital cost. Eventually, of course, the capital costs will
be such that the rm will prefer to exit the market, unless it is subsidised. The same
happens in our model when quality is raised above a critical threshold.
Lemma 3 Consumer welfare will rise monotonically with an increase in the
minimum quality standard, up to the point where the rm exits the market.
Proof This follows from Lemma 2, since a rise in QR leads to falling marginal
costs, inducing the rm to lower q.a. prices, which increase consumer surplus. Q.E.D.
2.2 Welfare implications
We compare di¤erent regulatory regimes using the su¢ xes U for unregulated solution,
G for globally best regulated solution, F for regulated solution with a foreign rm.
Where the rm is foreign, the regulator will seek to maximise consumer surplus,
regardless of the cost to prots, subject to the rm not exiting the market.
Figure 2: Imposition of a minimum quality standard on a monopoly.
The solutions are shown schematically in Figure 2. The area bounded by the
zero prot condition (thick line) represents the set of potentially protable solutions.
Point A, at quality QU , is chosen by an unconstrained monopolist. The ideal solution
for welfare would beW , which also lies on the cost-minimising ray through the origin,
though further out. However, a regulator could only force the rm to produce at
W by regulating both price and output. If we are assuming the regulator can only
set a minimum standard for quality, then the best he can do by raising quality is
to force the rm upwards along its response function (the thick dashed line). Point
G represents the global optimum achievable by quality regulation, where the sum of
producer and consumer surplus is maximised. F represents the regulators preferred
solution where the rm is foreign. G will lie above the unregulated monopolists
q.a. output, since the initial marginal cost to the rm from deviating from its
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cost-minimising mix of X and Q is innitessimal, while the induced increase in
output brings a gain to consumers. However, without making further assumptions,
we cannot determine for certain whether G lies within the feasible area, in terms of
nonnegative prots, or whether (as we have drawn at GG), it lies outside, so the
rm would exit without a subsidy.
To compare these points more formally, we restrict the analysis to a more limited
functional form (though many of the conclusions will carry over to a wide range of
well-behaved functional forms). We assume X is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of Y and
Q;
X = Y Q1 ;
where  2 (0; 1): Also, utility is assumed to be isoelastic: U = X; where  2 (0; 1).
Since the consumer will equate price to marginal utility, consumer surplus
(1) V= (1  )X:
A series of equations dening the solutions to this model is shown in Appendix 1
Table 1.8
Comparing the outcomes, we derive three propositions:
Proposition 1 The regulatory standard for a foreign monopolist under NT is
higher than that for a domestic monopolist, and both are higher than the rm itself
would choose.
Proof Comparing QG in equation Appendix 1 equation (1.11) with QU in (1.9),
where k2 and k3 are dened in Appendix 1 Table 1,
Q1 G
Q1 U
=
k2 + 1  k3
1  k3 > 1 ==> QG > QU :
Comparing QF in Appendix 1, equation (1.13) with QG,
Q1 F  Q1 G =
(1  k3)k1
b
  (k2 + 1  k3)k1
b
:
Since k1 and b are both positive, this will exceed zero if (1   )(1   k3) > k2:
Substituting in for ; k2 and k3, it can be shown to be equivalent to  < 1: But we
8Unlike some models (Ronnen (1991)), we explicitly derive consumer surplus, rather than just
focusing on consumer price, since we wish to be able to add it to producer surplus and derive total
welfare, W .
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have already assumed  2 (0; 1); so it will always hold, and QF > QG. Ranking th e
various standards, QF > QG > QU : Q.E.D.
It is also worth considering the implications of a mutual recognition agreement
in the case of a monopoly.
Proposition 2 Mutual recognition in the presence of a monopoly will result in
a reduction in quality and quality-adjusted trade volumes compared to national treat-
ment.
Proof Where the two countries are identical in size and consumer preferences,
the exporters regulator will seek to maximise WX = VX   2X , where subscript X
refers to the exporting country, and V and  conform to Appendix 1 equations (1.5)
and (1.8). The rst order condition for maximising WX with respect to QX is
@WX
@QX
= 0 ==> Q1 X = (
k2
2
+ 1  k3)k1
b
:
Comparing (6) with Appendix 1 equations (1.9) and (1.11), we can see that Q1 X
lies midway between Q1 U and Q
1 
G , being above the former and below the latter
(since  < 1). Lemma 2 shows that higher quality standards raise the quantity
supplied. We also note from (1.3) that quality-adjusted output X = 
=(1 )Q
=
X ,
which is monotonically increasing with respect to quality QX (at least over the range
where the imposed constraint is binding on the rm). Consequently, if the exporting
country sets lower standards than under NT, quality-adjusted output will also be
lower.
We can deduce that:
Proposition 3 The introduction of mutual recognition in place of national treat-
ment in the presence of a monopoly, will result in a reduction in consumer utility
in both the importing and the exporting country, but with a gain to the monopolists
prots. Overall, the exporting country gains and the importing country loses.
Proof Proposition 3 follows since lower quality standards (so long as they are
still above QU) benet the producer at the expense of consumers (inverting Lemma
3 ). Under NT, the importing country chooses quality, while under MR, the exporting
country chooses quality to maximise its welfare. Q.E.D.
[Note, the case where there is a monopoly rm and quality standards cannot be
varied across markets is complicated, involving bargaining - see Section 5.2 below.
The results of Proposition 3 will normally carry across, however].
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The overall sign of the net e¤ect on global welfare of a move to MR is not
straightforward to determine. Figure 3, below, indicates the results of numerical
simulations over a wide variety of parameter values. Mutual recognition reduces
global welfare in cases where  is low-to-middling, particularly when  is high. This
basically corresponds to those cases where a signicant weight in utility is given to
quality (note that NT results in higher quality than MR) and there is a high degree
of monopoly power. In other cases, welfare is reduced, particularly where  is low,
which leads to low monopoly power, as measured by rmsmarkup over marginal
cost.
Figure 3: e¤ect on global welfare of moving to national treatment from mutual
recognition, in the case of an exporting monopolist, given exible product standards.
3 National treatment in a duopoly with balanced
trade
We now extend the model to a duopoly. The analysis follows in the tradition of
prot-shifting duopoly models (see the survey in Brander (1995), or Brander (1981),
or Brander and Spencer (1985)). We concentrate on two identical countries, trading
reciprocally. We use a two stage setup: in the rst stage, each national regulator
sets the standards to apply in its market (or, in the case of MR, to its own producers
in both markets). In the second stage, the rms respond, competing on the basis of
Cournot conjectures. The regulators in the rst period are able to predict accurately
the outcome of this second-period subgame, and to exploit rst-mover advantage to
benet their ownrm and consumers at the expense of the foreign rm.
The model is solved subject to three possible sets of rules, and the outcomes
compared:
i) NT: the regulator in a country sets the standard for all goods sold in his market.
ii) A MR agreement: the quality standard for imports is set by the regulator in
the country of origin, rather than that of the importing country.
iii) Full cooperation between the regulators, to set a globally optimum harmonised
standard.
In this section, we assume that rms can costlessly set standards separately for
each market, so that, with NT, the regulator in one country can set standards re-
gardless of the behaviour of the other countrys regulator. Consequently, one can
ignore any strategic interaction between the regulators. By contrast, where there is
MR, the foreign regulator can determine the product quality of its exporting rm:
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this creates a higher-level regulatory game between the two countries, for which we
derive the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Section 5, below, discusses the e¤ect
of making it prohibitively costly for rms to vary the quality supplied to di¤erent
markets.
3.1 The duopoly model setup
The industry contains two identical rms, f = 1 and 2, set in countries c = 1 and
2 respectively. All consumers in both countries have identical tastes, and the rms
produce outputs which are perfect substitutes, with identical production functions.
As before, consumersutility in country 1 is a homothetic function of quality-adjusted
consumption, which we now denote Z1, where Z1 = X1;1 +X2;1; and X1;1 and X2;1
are aggregates of quality, Qf;c and unadjusted quantity, Yf;c. The production cost of
X, Cf;c; is a linear function of Y f;c and Qf;c.9 We assume here that rm f chooses
its quality to supply to each market separately. For simplicity, we drop the country
superscript from this point, except where specically needed.
There is a strong analogy with the monopoly case, although an unregulated
Cournot duopoly produces a higher level of q.a. output, XU ; and a higher level
of output for any level of regulation, compared to a monopolist. When a rm is un-
regulated, marginal cost is constant, as given by Appendix 1 (1.7). Likewise, when
country 1 sets a higher standard than the unregulated duopoly would choose, mar-
ginal costs for rm f fall as Q=Xf rises. The quality standard and output levels
chosen by the unregulated duopoly are still suboptimal, at point A0 rather than W ,
on Figure 4, using the prime to denote the noncooperative Cournot duopoly case,
and there is a potential benet from regulation. However, there are two di¤erences.
First, we must now distinguish between two regulatory outcomes: the one where
both rms are domestic (which is the global best achievable by quality regulation
alone, G0), and the other where the regulator ignores the foreign rms prots, which
would potentially lead to a higher standard. The other di¤erence is that, since the
duopoly has lower prots than an unregulated monopoly, its prots are eliminated
more quickly as standards are raised (at quality Q00). This is shown in the diagram
as constraining the quality standard Q0F which the regulator can set at E
0 rather
than E 00 as he would prefer.
9 Strictly speaking, if the values of scale parameters in equation (1) were invariant
with the number of rms, the smaller rms in a duopoly case would be producing
a lower quality than the monopolist in the rst case. However, a slightly modied
formulation (eg where costs are a function of output and quality per plant, and the
number of plants) would return the model to the classical features where a monopoly
results in lower quality and quantity.
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Figure 4: Imposition of a minimum standard on a Cournot duopoly.
To proceed further, we again need to make some more precise functional form
restrictions. We assume, once again, that demand for q.a. output is isoelastic10, so
that consumer surplus in country 1 is given by
V1 = (1  )Z1 ;
which is very similar to (1).
Since both countries are analogous, we concentrate on country 1, ignoring national
subscripts, and dropping the prime for the Cournot case. We follow the Cournot-
Nash assumption that f chooses Xf as a response to its conjecture of its rivals
output.11 If we denote the rmsrespective marginal costs MC1 and MC2; then the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is dened by the following equations for total output, Z,
and for relative output of the two rms
Z = X1 +X2 = [
MC1 +MC2
(1 + )
]
1
 1 ; and
(2)  =
X2
X1
=
MC1   MC2
MC2   MC1 ;
Note that X1 = Z=(1 + ) and X2 = Z=(1 + ): These conditions determine the
market outcome of the Cournot subgame between the rms.12 Where standards are
set noncooperatively, and the rms are symmetric in costs, then we can concentrate
on the symmetric equilibrium where  = 1 and X1 = X2:
From the above equations, we can deduce the equilibrium properties of the model.
These are summarised in Appendix 1 Table 1.2.
First note:
Lemma 4 A regulated duopoly will sell more quality-adjusted output than an
unregulated duopoly, and this output rises monotonically with the quality standard.
10See Neary [1994]. The choice of 0 <  < 1 in this paper ensures that, in a
symmetric model, the two goods are strategic substitutes.
11The alternative Bertrand-Nash duopoly is uninteresting unless rmsoutput is
di¤erentiated.
12Equation (9) yields non-negative values for X1 and X2 as long as the numerator
and denominator carry the same sign, which will be the case if 1=> MC2=MC1 >
:This implies that either MC2 and MC1 are close in value or that  is small.
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Proof If QR is set exogenously by the regulator, then Appendix 1 , equation
(2.2) and the equivalent equation for rm 2 show that combined output of the two
rms is an isoelastic function of the quality standard set by the regulator. Since
;  2 (0; 1); we can deduce that @Z=@Q is positive. Q.E.D.
Analysis with no breakeven constraint.
There is a strong analogy to regulation of a monopoly, except that a duopoly sets
somewhat higher output levels. There follows
Lemma 5 Consumer surplus with a quality regulated Cournot duopoly rises
monotonically with the minimum quality standard.
Proof This follows since sales rise monotonically with the minimum quality
standard (Lemma 4 ), and utility rises monotonically with sales (Appendix 1, (2.4)).
Q.E.D.
Lemma 6 If there is no constraint that rmsprots exceed zero, then regulators
under national treatment will always set standards higher than the global optimum
standard.
Proof Comparing Appendix 1 equations (2.7) with (2.9), where K2 and K3 are
constants as dened in Appendix 1 Table 2 :
Q1 F  Q1 G
Q1 G
=
K2
2
K2
2
+ 1 K3
;
which is positive given K2 > 0 and 1  K3 > 0. Since  2 (0; 1); this implies that
QF > QG: Q.E.D.
Analysis with a breakeven constraint
The standard, Q0; at which prots fall to zero, is given by Appendix 1, equation
(2.10). This always exceeds QG for ranges of  and  between 0 and 1.13 However,
Q0 may constrain QF , depending upon parameter values:
Lemma 7 Unless  is su¢ ciently high relative to ; the quality standard set
under NT will either be constrained to the highest standard at which rms do not
make a loss, or the rms will have to be subsidised.
13Proof available.
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Comparing Appendix 1 (2.7) and (2.10), we can say that QF will exceed Q0 if
and only if (1 K3)K1=b < [K2+1 K3]K1=b; which is equivalent to the condition
that
(3)  <
2
3   .
Most combinations of f; g between 0 and 1 satisfy (3) - see Figure 5, below -
and we would expect the breakeven constraint to limit standard setting in these
circumstances. Q.E.D.
Figure 5: combinations of  and  for which the regulatory standard is con-
strained.
The constraint is not binding only where  is high (i.e. relatively little value
is placed on quality) and  is low (which implies elastic demand, and hence less
monopolistic distortion in the absence of regulation).
The lemmas above can be summarised as:
Proposition 4 With a symmetric Cournot duopoly and national treatment, the
global optimum standard will be greater than the unregulated quality. The standard
chosen by the regulator in a noncooperative subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium will be
above the global optimum, but the extent to which it exceeds the global optimum will
be restricted if the condition in (11) does not hold, so long as there are no subsidies.
The analysis in this section potentially casts a new light on the best-known
cross-hauling duopoly, the Boeing-Airbus case. (Pavcnik (2002). Irwin and Pavcnik
(2004)). Both rms are recipients of overt and covert subsidies, which are commonly
interpreted as being a war for market-share. However, safety and environmental
concerns are crucially important, so regulation is likely to be an important item in
driving costs. While subsidies may well be excessive, this may potentially reect ex-
cessively high regulatory quality standards, to benet consumers (in terms of extra
safety) at the expense of the foreign rm.
4 Analysis with mutual recognition
We now examine a mutual recognition agreement. The two country regulators play a
standard-setting game, taking into account the anticipated result of changes in their
national standard upon the outcome of the Cournot subgames between the rms in
both national markets. MR changes these games, in that each national regulator is
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now assumed to be able to set the standard for its own rm in both markets, but
cannot directly inuence the standard the foreign rm sets.
Comparison with either the global optimum standard or the NT standard is
complicated, since there a number of contradictory e¤ects. These stem from noting
that national welfare
W = V + S  FC;
where V is domestic consumersutility, S is the domestic rms market share and
FC is the domestic rms xed cost. Hence, if we di¤erentiate (12) with respect to
Q,
@W
@Q
=
@V
@Q
+ S
@
@Q
+
@S
@Q
  @FC
@Q
:
The terms of the di¤erential are, respectively, the consumer surplus e¤ect, the na-
tions share of the producer surplus e¤ect, the prot-shifting e¤ect and the e¤ect on
xed costs. These are summarised in Table 1 , below.
E¤ect of raising a E¤ect on Rel. e¤ect NT MR
minimum quality national welfare on global
standard v national
welfare
Consumer surplus @V
@Q
+ but declining x4 x2 x1
Tot prod surplus + but
excl xed cost S @
@Q
declining <@FC
@Q
x4 x1 x2
Prot shifting  @S
@Q
+ -  
(Minus) Quality-related
xed cost per negative
rm/market @FC
@Q
= b and constant x4 x1 x2
Table 1: summary comparison of the e¤ects of raising minimum quality standards
under di¤erent regulatory regimes.
Key di¤erences are that, under NT, domestic consumers benet from the rise
in quality of both rmsoutput, but the loss to the foreign rm (at the margin) is
ignored. Under MR, consumers only benet from the rise in quality for domestically-
produced goods (so the marginal consumer benet is halved), but the cost of raising
the quality of exports is borne by the domestic producer (while the gain to foreign
consumers is ignored). However, there is a prot-shifting e¤ect, on the lines of
15
Brander-Spencer, whereby the quality increase raises the market share of country 1s
goods in both markets (home and export), increasing prot.
The standard set by regulator 1 in each case are summarised as:
global optimum:
@WG
@QG
= 0 =>
@V
@QG
+
@
@QG
= b;(4)
NT:
@W1N
@Q1N
= 0 => 2
@V
@Q1N
+
@
@Q1N
= b;(5)
MR:
@WM
@Q1M
= 0 =>
@V
@Q1M
+ 2
@
@Q1M
+ 2
@S1
@Q1M
= 2b:(6)
Comparing the global optimum with the NT, for any given value of Q1, the left
hand side of the NT equation is greater than for the global optimum by @V=@Q1N :
Since marginal benets of raising standards decline as Q1 is raised, this implies the
value of Q1 which satises equation (5) will be greater than that which satises (14),
which we have already established more formally (Q1N > QG). A comparison of
the solution to (6) with those for (4) and (5) is more complicated, because there
is a prot-shifting e¤ect when standards are set according to MR (and this prot
shift will depend on the rival regulators standard). However, if we concentrate
on a symmetric equilibrium (where both regulators set the same standard), then
comparison is a little more straightforward. Rewriting (4) as
@WG
@QG
= 0 => 2
@V
@QG
+ 2
@
@QG
= 2b;
we see that, for any given level of global standards
@WM
@Q1M
  @WG
@QG
= 2
@S1
@Q1M
  @V
@QG
:
Essentially, this tells us that, if we initially look at global optimum standards, where
@WG=@QG = 0; regulator 1 under MR will want to raise standards if and only if the
prot-shifting e¤ect outweighs the e¤ect of ignoring the gain in quality to foreign
consumers.
Strictly, to solve this problem, we need to model it in terms of comparative statics,
solving for the equilibrium. Nevertheless, the implication of (5) is that the outcome
of the MR setup depends critically upon the prot-shifting e¤ect, which means that
we need to look carefully at the modelling of regulatorsbehaviour and market shares.
I assume that each regulator will act on the conjecture that the other regulators
strategy (and hence, the foreign rms standard) is exogenous: an equilibrium is
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where actual standards equal conjectured ones for both countries. An equilibrium
can also be seen as the point of intersection of the two regulatorsreaction functions.
Where these are monotonically-sloping, there will be only one point of intersection,
at a symmetric equilibrium where Q1 = Q2.
Let us start by considering the equations governing the reaction functions of
the two regulators. Regulator 1 will assume regulator 2 will maintain a constant
standard, so Qc2 = Q
c
2. He will then choose Q1 to maximise domestic welfare
14.
W1 = V1+2R1c 2V C1c 2bQ1;where the subscript c notes rm 1s revenue or costs
in any one market. The solution to this optimisation problem depends crucially upon
the e¤ect of altering Q1 upon the two rmsoutputs. First, consider how rm 1s
market share (S1, which is the same in both markets) will alter with respect to its
quality (keeping Q
c
2 constant). If the ratio of marginal costs, MC2=MC1, is denoted
M , then we can derive from (2) that
(7) S1 =
M   
(1 +M)(1  ) ;
and so
@S1
@M
= S21
1  2
(M   )2 :
Noting that  < 1; @S1=@M is positive as long as M is greater than , and
decreases as M rises. Note from (7) that S1 reaches 1 when M reaches 1=: Also,
from the relationship of marginal costs to output, we can derive that
M =

Q1(1  S1)
Q
c
2
 1 

:
@M
@Q1
=
(1  )(M   )(1  M)
(1  M)(1  M 1) + ((1  )(M   ))Q1
:
This leads to
Lemma 8 S1 is monotonically upward-sloping with respect to Q1 , reaching 1
when Q1=1=:
Proof Note that @M=@Q1 = 0 when M =  or M = 1=: If we therefore conne
ourselves to the range  < M < 1=; given  2 (0; 1), then the numerator of (7) is
positive, as are (1 M), (1 M 1) and (1 )(M  ): It follows that, over this
range, @M=@Q1 > 0: Since from the chain rule @S1=@Q1 = (@S1=@M) (@M=@Q1),
and both of these are positive over the range  < M < 1=, then S1M is monotonically
14Regulator 2s decision is a mirror-image of this.
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upward-sloping in terms of Q1, curving o¤ as S1M approaches 1: This is conrmed
by numerical simulation. Q.E.D.
Derivation of symmetric equilibrium values
Given the complexity of some of the di¤erentials, we concentrate on symmetric
equilibria.15 A symmetric, pure strategy equilibrium is one where Q1 = Qc1 = Q2 =
Qc2. Because it is symmetric, we can solve it just looking at country 1s decision
as a response to country 2s standard setting. Consequently, we start by examining
the locus of symmetric quality regulations, where Q1 = Q
c
2. A symmetric Nash
equilibrium is a point on this locus where neither regulator will wish to adjust quality
(assuming the other regulators standard is constant). To be practicable, such an
equilibrium must also lie above the standard the rms would independently set,
and below the level at which they exit the market. Concentrating on regulator 1s
decision: he will assume regulator 2 will maintain the initial standard, Q
c
2. Regulator
1 will then choose a new standard Q1 in order to maximise his conjecture of welfare
in country 1. In equilibrium, both national markets will be split equally between the
rms. We can easily simplify (6)-(7) substituting M = 1 and S1 = 1=2. This allows
us to derive the result that
@S1
@Q1
=
1
4
K4
Q1
,
where K4 =
(1  2)(1  )
(1  )((1  ) + (1  )) > 0:
In addition, note that the marginal e¤ect on total sales of increasing just Q1
is half that of increasing both countriesstandards simultaneously. The latter has
already been shown to be an isoelastic function of quality, so we can write:
@Z1
@Q1
=
K 0Q
2
 

;
where K 0 = (=)	=(1 )2(1 2)=(1 ): Having determined the marginal e¤ects of
changing Q1 on total sales and on the rms shares, it is not di¢ cult to derive
the marginal e¤ects on rm 1s revenue and variable cost (in each market) and on
consumer surplus.16 Taken together, these equations dene a symmetric equilibrium
15The equivalent equations for the more general case, which allows for asymmetric
equilibria, are available on request. Numerical checks on a range of values of  and 
between 0:3 and 0:7 conrmed that the model has an unique, stable solution within
the feasible range with positive output.
16Available on request.
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for quality in the MR case. While it is possible to derive a reduced form from these
equations and solve it for the equilibrium value of Q1 = Q
c
2, which we denote Q, it is
not particularly informative in this case, which is why we prefer to derive a solution
by numerical means.
4.1 Numerical analysis
It is not possible to derive meaningful comparative static solutions for the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium with MR by analytical means. Consequently, we proceed by
numerical simulation. Tables 2 and 3 summarise the degree to which the constrained
quality under NT and the quality under MR exceed the global optimum in these
simulations.
eQN QG
QG
 =
 = 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0.3 0.15* 0.13* 0.10* 0.08* 0.06* 0.04*
0.4 0.23* 0.19* 0.16* 0.13* 0.10* 0.07*
0.5 0.34* 0.29* 0.24* 0.19* 0.14* 0.10*
0.6 0.50* 0.43* 0.35* 0.28* 0.21* 0.14*
0.7 0.77* 0.66* 0.54* 0.43* 0.32* 0.22*
0.8 0.93 0.91 0.91* 0.72* 0.54* 0.36*
Table 2: di¤erence between standards under national treatment and the global
optimum standard, taking account of the nonnegative prot constraint.17
QM QG
QG
 =
 = 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0.3 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.4 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
0.5 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
0.6 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02
0.7 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
0.8 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
17* denotes nonnegative prot constraint is binding.
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Table 3: Di¤erence between the standard set under mutual recognition (taking
account of the nonnegative prot constraint) and the global optimum standard.
A more general summary of the conclusions of the simulations carried out is as
follows:
First, Table 2 conrms the conclusions of the theoretical analysis that, in all
cases, QN > QG > QU . QU varies between 55 and 62 per cent of the global optimum
standard, QG. In all cases examined, the zero prot quality, Q0 exceeds the global
optimum, QG. In addition, the nonnegative prot constraint, Q0 will constrain the
local regulator under NT, except where  is relatively high and  relatively low.
Table 3 shows that, In all the cases examined, QM > QG. This indicates that
the prot shifting e¤ect outweighs any gain to prots from cutting quality sold to
foreigners. However, this di¤erence is marginal, and in practice the di¤erence be-
tween QM and QG is very small in all cases. We would therefore expect MR to be
welfare-improving compared to NT. However, consumers are worse o¤. Note that
Q0, does not constrain the quality set under MR in any of the cases examined.
Figure 6, below, shows the comparative welfare gain from moving from NT to
MR. In all cases, welfare under MR lies less than 0:1 per cent below the global
optimum.
Figure 6: Per cent gain in global welfare from moving to mutual recognition from
noncooperative national treatment.
Comparing Figure 6 to the monopoly case (Figure 3 ), note that in a symmet-
ric duopoly MR is always welfare-increasing compared to NT. However, as in the
monopoly case, MR is most benecial when  is high, implying that consumers place
relatively little value on quality (so that the lower quality standards in equilibrium
under MR have less e¤ect on consumer welfare).
As with any numerical simulations, a word of caution is needed: it is not possible
to conrm that the results carry over to parameter values other than those investi-
gated. Due to the nonlinearity of the model, values of  or  less than 0:3 or greater
than 0:8 could not be investigated. Also, some di¤erent functional forms might give
qualitatively di¤erent results.18
Finally in this section, it is worth noting that, in common with most of the lit-
erature on national treatment and mutual recognition, this paper has assumed the
18In principle, if regulators reaction functions are backward-bending, then it is possible they
intersect again at some point other than the symmetric equilibrium. However, numerical simulations
for a variety of combinations of f; g suggest near-linear reaction functions.
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countries are identical in terms of size and representative consumerstastes. Exten-
sion to cover all possible asymmetries of the countries would probably be beyond the
scope of this paper.19
5 Quality rigidities
The previous sections have assumed that rms can costlessly change quality between
the two national markets, in response to national regulators specications. This
is probably not a realistic assumption. An alternative is to assume that the rm
must set the same standard for both markets, since the cost of varying standards is
prohibitive.
5.1 Duopoly
Consider rst the duopoly case. If standards are set under MR, then the analysis
is unchanged from that in Section 4. above. This is because, under MR, a rm
always sets a single standard anyway, determined by its own national regulator. By
contrast, if rms cannot vary quality across markets, then the e¤ects of NT upon
standard-setting are interesting. We assume that regulator 1 is setting a standard,
and that regulator 2 has not set a higher standard (so limiting regulator 1s freedom
to a¤ect local standards). Regulator 1 will choose a standard, QN , to maximise
(8) W1N = V1N +R1N +R2N   2C1N ;
where R1N is rm 1s revenue in its home market and R2N is its revenue in the export
market. Note the nal term in (22) - if regulator 1 increases its standard, it imposes
extra cost on rm 1s sales in both markets. In both cases (unlike MR), if regulator
1 raises the standard, both rms have to raise quality in both markets.
Compare this with the decision made by a single global regulator to maximise
global welfare. In this case, assuming symmetric costs and demand functions in the
two countries, he is maximising
(9) WG = 2V1G + 2R1G + 2R2G   4C1G;
and comparing (8) with (9) we derive the result
QN = QG:
19If we allowed taste parameter  to vary, then under mutual recognition, the country with
greater taste for quality would desire to set a higher standard for its rm in both markets (so the
equilibrium would be asymmetric).
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E¤ectively, in (8), regulator 1 is considering the consumer surplus of half the Worlds
consumers, compared to the prot of half the Worlds producers, in a model where
both rms have to produce to the same minimum standard.20
Hence, we can derive
Proposition 5: If rms cannot vary standards across markets, then, in equilib-
rium, regulators will set the globally optimum standard under national treatment.
Proof: From (8) and (9) the rst order conditions for an optimum are
@V1N
@Q1N
+
@R1N
@Q1N
+
@R2N
@Q1N
  2@C1N
@Q1N
= 0;
2
@V1G
@Q1G
+ 2
@R1G
@Q1G
+ 2
@R2G
@Q1G
  4@C1G
@Q1G
= 0:
These will clearly be satised by Q1N = QN = QG.
In this case, NT will result in higher welfare than MR. It follows that the case for
MR in a symmetric, cross-hauling classical Cournot duopoly, rests upon rms being
able to supply at di¤erent standards in the two markets.
5.2 Monopoly/unbalanced trade with mutual recognition and
inexible quality standards
As in the duopoly case, the setting of quality standards under MR is una¤ected by
making quality standards across the two countries inexible.
The situation where there is only one producer, in one country but exporting
to the other, and where the standard cannot vary across markets is the most com-
plicated, because it introduces a game between the two regulators: the importing
country regulator wants to set the highest standard consistent with the rm not
exiting the market (as in Section 3, above). However, now, the issue of whether the
rm will exit the market depends upon standards set in both countries.
To see this, consider a situation where the monopolist is located in country 2.
The importing country regulator 1 would like to set a minimum quality standard atbQF , as in Figure 1 , where the hat indicates we are in a game with invariant quality
20The analysis above needs to be slightly qualied, however. If regulator 2 sets a higher standard
than QN , say eQ, then there is no incentive for regulator 1 to set a lower standard than eQ (since a
lower standard set unilaterally would have no e¤ect), unless eQ is so high that country 1 is better
o¤ foregoing prots from exports to the foreign market. Since this applies in reverse (to regulator
2s response to regulator 1), it is conceivable that quality standards could become stuck in an
equilibrium higher than QN :
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across the two markets. However, the exporting country regulator, 2, can now a¤ect
the rms decision on whether to exit the market in country 1, and so can a¤ectbQF , by deliberately setting a low minimum standard, QL; in its home market. The
highest level of bQF which regulator 1 can set is the level where the rm is indi¤erent
between selling to both markets at quality bQF , or just selling to its domestic market
at QL, which involves a lower xed cost. This relationship will satisfy
2RFf bQFg  RLfQLg = b(2 bQF  QL);
2 bQF  QL = b(2 bQF  QL)K1(1 K3) :
So long as QL > QU , lowering it will increase the rms reservation prot - the level
of prots it needs to make in both markets to induce it to accept selling into the
export market. This means regulator 1 cannot set such a high level of bQF .
The implication of this is that we face a bargaining situation: regulator 1 de-
termines the quality bQF at which the good is sold in both markets but, as long as
QL > QU , regulator 2 can set an upper limit on bQF . Welfare in country 1 is max-
imised when bQF = QF as in equation (1.13). Welfare in country 2 is maximised
when bQF = QX , as in (6) (so long as regulator 1 can constrain regulator 2 by setting
a value of QL > QU). Where both regulators have perfect certainty, we would expect
a Nash bargaining outcome somewhere between their preferred values of bQF :
Numerical simulations of this Nash bargaining model (compared to MR and to
NT where quality is exible) are shown in Appendix 2. The assumed bargaining
weights are 50  50. Note that no cases were found where QL < QU , so in all cases
examined, quality is set by a Nash bargain over the range between QX and QF (as
dened in Section 2, above). Also note that, in all cases examined, when quality is
inexible, combined welfare across the two countries is higher with NT than with MR.
This is because the exporting/producing country, if unconstrained, would choose to
set a suboptimal standard at QX (which is in fact the standard which reigns under
MR), while the importing country wants to set a superoptimal standard at QF . The
compromise standard under Nash bargaining with equal weights, is an improvement
on either of those extremes. The overall loss to combined welfare from MR compared
to NT is shown in Figure 7, below, and the exporting country is worse o¤, though
the importing country is better o¤.
Figure 7: combined welfare gain NT compared to MR, with inexible product
quality.
Comparing Figure 7 to the case with exible standards (Figure 3 ), in the inex-
ible case MR always produces a loss in welfare, whereas with exible standards this
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is only the case where  and  are relatively high. However, again, MR performs less
badly where  is high (so the weighting placed on quality is less).
However, it is worth raising an alternative outcome: where the two regulators are
less certain about each others reaction functions, a stando¤ is possible in this game,
in the form of a war of attrition, whereby trade is temporarily blocked because the
two regulators set standards so far apart that the rm chooses not to export - each
regulator waiting either for the other regulator to back down, or for an arbitrator
such as the WTO to step in. This opens up a series of potentially interesting but
complicated games, which would require another paper to analyse properly.
Another possibility is that the foreign rm cannot altogether avoid xed costs
by exiting the export market. In this case, the bargaining power of the importing
country would be higher than indicated above, and Nash bargaining over national
treatment would result in a higher quality standard, with lower overall welfare.
6 Pure horizontal barriers
The focus of this paper is primarily upon vertical standards - those which produce a
measurable gain to consumer welfare. However, the issue of pure horizontal barriers
is worth some discussion, since these are the focus of a signicant literature on
TBTs (e.g. Maskus and Wilson (eds., 2001)). A pure horizontal TBT (henceforth
a HTBT) can only be applied where two rms are using di¤erent technology to get
similar outcomes. The HTBT might be of a pure, cost-increasing variety (forcing
the foreign rm to impose some form of adaptation on its produce in order to access
the export market), or might even, in extremes, lead to exclusion of the foreign rm
and imposition of a domestic monopoly.
If we consider a HTBT, this can be seen as raising the marginal cost of sales
for the foreign rm by proportion  (so that the marginal cost of the foreign good
becomes (1 + )MC, while the domestic rms marginal cost is just MC). The cost
MC is a resource cost: as such, regulator 1 would usually prefer to impose an
equivalent tari¤, since that raises revenue. Nevertheless, if tari¤s are ruled out, or
seen as too visible (and hence likely to provoke retaliation), then a HTBT may be
applied.
Edwards (2009) examines the case of a Cournot duopoly with linear demand
functions, and concludes that, where tari¤s are ruled out, a HTBT will be chosen
to exclude the foreign rm. Ironically, a smaller HTBT may not be attractive, since
domestic welfare with linear demand is a quadratic function of  , and often decreases
for a small value of  before increasing. Nevertheless, some cautions must be added.
First, a HTBT may not simply be a di¤erentiable cost such as  : there may be only
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one level of barrier available (the product has to meet local technical specications),
which may or may not end up excluding the foreign rm. Secondly, the welfare e¤ects
of the HTBT seem to be very specic to the functional form of the demand model.
In addition, a HTBT which simply increases costs for the foreign rm would seem to
be in breach of the WTO agreement (World Trade Organization (1995)), as cited at
the beginning of this paper - and hence should not, in principle, be acceptable under
NT. However,the WTO has had problems enforcing the agreement in such cases - as
the discussion in Maskus and Wilson (eds., 2001) shows.
Consider the welfare e¤ects for country 1 imposing a cost-raising HTBT of 
against rm 2. We stick to the case where marginal costs before the HTBT are equal
for the two rms. The welfare e¤ects in the importing country of the HTBT are: i)
the loss of consumer surplus from raising rm 2s costs, (@V=@Z) (@Z=@) (this has a
negative e¤ect on welfare); ii) rm 1s share of the change in total prot from raising
prices, S1 (@=@Z) (@Z=@) (this is positive when prices are below the collusive level,
but declining); iii) the prot shift e¤ect (@S1=@), where  and C are the joint
prot and joint variable cost of the two rms. (Note that the analysis in this section
assumes equal marginal costs before the HTBT is imposed.)
These e¤ects are summarised in Table 4, below.
Welfare e¤ect Sign E¤ect
when  = 0
i. Consumer surplus @V
@Z
@Z
@
=   1
(2+)
Z -  1
2
Z
ii. Total prot e¤ect S1 @@Z
@Z
@
= S1
1 (1+)
(1 )(2+)2Z
 + 1
8
Z
iii. Prot shift e¤ect @S1
@
= S21
1+
(2+)(1+ )(1  )Z + 18(1 + )Z
Overall welfare e¤ect   1
(2+)
Z + S1
1 (1+)
(1 )(2+)2Z

+S21
1+
(2+)(1+ )(1  )Z -  28 Z
Table 4: Welfare e¤ects in country 1 of a HTBT against imports from country 2.
The right hand column evaluates the various marginal welfare e¤ects when there
is no initial HTBT, and nds that the net marginal e¤ect is negative (since  < 1).
However, given the complexity of these functions, it is also necessary to investigate
whether welfare might turn upwards at some point, as the HTBT is increased. Nu-
merical simulations conrm this does not happen.
In a linear model, each marginal increase in the HTBT causes a constant shift
in market share towards the domestic rm, and since prices rise as the HTBT is
imposed, the prot shift is increasing. This causes the prot shift to outweigh the
loss of consumer surplus, at least beyond a point (hence favouring total exclusion of
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the foreign rm). By contrast, with an isoelastic model, the shift in market share,
@S1=@; tails o¤ as  increases, so that prot shift does not increase. Hence, the
latter model does not favour horizontal protection.
Given the contradictory results from various demand functional forms, it is only
safe to conclude that it is uncertain whether pure horizontal protection is likely to
occur.
7 Comparison with alternative oligopoly models
Most previous studies of quality regulations21 have built on Shaked and Suttons
(1982) adaptation of a Hotelling linear framework to a vertical oligopoly. In this
spatial representation of product di¤erentiation, consumers di¤er in tastes, but have
unitary demand (1 or zero units per head). The applications to minimum prod-
uct standards in trade have all concentrated on a duopoly. Choosing a relatively
restricted functional form (Lutz (1996), (2000), and Lutz and Baliamoune-Lutz
(2003)), individual i chooses whether or not to purchase one unit of the good g,
and if so, whether to purchase from the upmarket provider, u, or the downmarket
provider d. Willingness to pay is a linear function of the goods quality, depending
on an individual taste parameter, ti; assumed to follow a uniform, rectangular dis-
tribution. The individual chooses to purchase the commodity from one supplier by
comparing the relative qualities to the di¤erence in prices. Lutz (1996) also assumes
total costs are a quadratic function of quality.
By setting an excessively wide quality di¤erence, rms u and d can raise prices.
A regulator can put downward pressure on prices by imposing a minimum standard
on d, which narrows the gap between the rms (Das and Donnenfeld (1989)). Where
there is an increasing product development cost, related to quality, then the mini-
mum standard leads to lower prices per unit quality (Ronnen (1991)), and leads to
increasing total sales. The lower quality regulator supplies at the minimum quality
standard, while the higher-quality supplier overcomplies, in order to satisfy con-
sumers with a higher taste for quality. A rise in the minimum quality causes both
rms to raise quality and lower prices per unit quality (Ronnen (1991)). However,
when there are two national regulators, the tendency is to raise the standard too
high, shifting prot from the foreign rm to local consumers (who benet from lower
21Das and Donnenfeld (1989), Crampes and Hollander (1995), Lutz (1996 and
2000), Lutz and Baliamoune-Lutz (2003) and Boom (1995) have applied the Shaked-
Sutton model to international standard-setting, as do more recent studies by Jinji and
Toshimitsu (2004) and Toshimitsu and Jinji (2008). There are too many examples
of studies on standard-setting in the single-country Shaked-Sutton case to list here.
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price). On Lutzs (1996) functional form assumptions, MR results in the setting of
optimum standards.
While studies have provided an important theoretical underpinning to mutual
recognition, they su¤er by assumption from the limitation of the unitary demand
assumption, which rules out the classical oligopoly biases, which are the focus of this
paper, by assumption. On the other hand, the classical model in this paper does
not allow for consumer heterogeneity, and is also limited. Given the di¢ culty of
constructing a generalised hybrid, it is probably sensible to regard the two setups
as special cases, both o¤ering insights, but which may be more or less applicable
depending on the precise industry. In general, one might expect the Shaked-Sutton
model to be more specically applicable to lumpy durables such as cars or wash-
ing machines, while the classical oligopoly model applies best where purchases are
non-lumpy.22 Where the quantity of the product purchased is determined by the
purchase of a more expensive item (for example, the number of curtains purchased
by a household depend on the number of windows in a house) then the Shaked-
Sutton framework is likely to be favoured. By contrast, where the household loves
(horizontal) variety, then a fall in prices will cause it to purchase more items of the
good, as well as higher quality.
A recent paper of relevance is Costinot (2008), who compares regulatory regimes
based upon national treatment and upon mutual recognition, in a two-country, two-
rm framework, in the case of a good, the consumption of which creates an external-
ity. Demand by each consumer is assumed to be unitary or zero. Costinot assumes
a simple binary standard: goods are either high-polluting or low-polluting, which re-
duces the framework to that of a prisoners dilemma game. Government imposition
of a low polluting standard under national treatment leads to some direct benets
to consumers, but also to a reduction in the externality. Critically, under mutual
recognition, there is a temptation to a race to the bottomin standards, since na-
tional governments do not concern themselves with externalities in other countries.
However, this is partially tempered by a Brander-Krugman type prot-shifting mo-
tive - similar to that identied in this paper. Since this prot-shifting e¤ect (in
both Costinots paper and in this one) is only signicant when consumers themselves
prefer better quality goods, Costinots important conclusion is that mutual recog-
nition is only preferable where externalities are relatively small compared to direct
consumer gains from improved quality. His paper also looks at horizontal (network
22However, even these cases may not be so clear-cut: many households in the
West now own more than one automobile, while if quality is dened in terms of
durability, then arguably a higher quality product will tend to substitute for less
frequent purchases, so quality and quantity are substitutes.
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externality) barriers, which we do not directly consider here.
Some empirical studies (notably Arora and Cason (1995)) nd over-compliance of
environmental or other standards. While, at rst sight, this is not easy to reconcile
with theoretical models,23 a number of reasons have been suggested for this phe-
nomenon (Harrington, 1988). It is worth bearing in mind that supplied quality may
reect labelling and transparency regulations, rather than just technical standards.24
8 Conclusion
Compared to studies to date, the classical oligopoly treats minimum standards as
a response to di¤erent regulatory problems - in the latter, the case, the underpro-
vision of quality by an oligopoly, while, in the former, the creation of an excessive
di¤erentiation between products.25 Which of these e¤ects is the more important may
depend on the industry in question. Nevertheless, there are similarities in the way
the prot-shifting motive leads to strategic overregulation. The apparently contra-
dictory nding on the e¤ect on trade - which rises in the classical, Cournot oligopoly
model, but falls in the spatial di¤erentiation case - may simply reect the di¢ culty
of aggregating goods of di¤erent quality: in the classical duopoly model, the con-
clusion of rising trade relies upon weighting quantities by quality, while the spatial
di¤erentiation conclusion is based upon unadjusted quantities, so that the studies
are not taking account of the di¤erent unit value of, say, Mercedes and Skodas.
A second interesting nding is that, when rms cannot vary the quality at which
they supply the two markets, there is no distortion in standard-setting under national
treatment with a symmetric, cross-hauling duopoly.
The more signicant di¤erence from the previous literature is the examination of
the strategic biases present with unbalanced trade. In particular, this paper suggests
the mutual recognition principle should not be applied indiscriminately as a condi-
tion of multilateral trade liberalisation regimes. Assessment of the welfare e¤ects of
harmonisation or mutual recognition should not be carried out on the assumption
that regulations are purely cost-increasing. Indeed national variations in standards
may genuinely reect di¤erences in national preferences with regard to risk, quality
23In the basic Cournot model, neither rm will overcomply, while in a Shaked-Sutton model, only
one rm will overcomply.
24Arora and Casons (1995) empirical nding that over-compliance is mainly a feature of industries
with low concentration may be seen as consistent with this interpretation.
25It should be added that the classical oligopoly interpretation - regulation is needed
to counteract undersupply of quality by big business - is more in tune with the stated
objectives of most national product regulation.
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etc. A general mutual recognition principle could lead to its application in indus-
tries where one country dominates production, and there is a consequent danger of
dilution of product standards for all importing countries.26
26This can, of course, be limited if the mutual recognition regime also includes an
element of minimal standards centrally imposed across all countries, as happens, for
example, under the European Unions mixed approach to the Single Market.
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Appendix 1: Tables of the principal models
Table 1.1: equations governing the equilibrium with a monopolist
Solution for monopoly Isoelastic/Cobb-Douglas form
Unconstrained quality (1.1) QU = (1b
1 

)XU :
Minimum unit cost (1.2) c0 = 1 (
1
b
1 

) 1 = 1

(XU
QU
)
1 
 :
Q.a.output* (1.3) X = 


1 Q


; where 
 = 2 > 0;
and  = (1 )
1  , which lies between 0 and 1.
Revenue* (1.4) R = k1Q; where k1 = 


1  > 0:
Consumer surplus* (1.5) V = k2R; where k2 =
1 

:
Costs* (1.6) C = k3R  bQ; where k3 = :
Marginal cost* (1.7) MC = @C
X
= 1

(X
Q
)
1 
 :
Prot* (1.8)  = (1  k3)k1Q   bQ:
Prot-maximising quality (1.9) Q1 U = (1  k3) k1b :
Welfare (domestic rm)* (1.10) W = (1 + k2   k3)k1Q   bQ:
maximum when* (1.11) Q1 G = Q
1  = (k2 + 1  k3) k1b :
Welfare (rm is foreign)* (1.12) WF = k2k1Q; monotonically increasing wrt Q:
Zero prot* (1.13) (1  k3)k1Q= bQ;==>Q1 F = (1  k3)k1b :
Unadjusted output* (1.14) Y = 

1
1 Q
 (1 )2
(1 ) ;
V@Y
@Q
< 0: Unadjusted output falls.
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27*denotes quality is regulated
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Table 1.2: equations governing the equilibrium with a cross-hauling duopoly
Duopoly with NT isoelastic/Cobb-Douglas functional form
Unregulated quality (2.1) QU = 	
1
1  2
2 
 1 (1
b
1 

)
1
1  ;where 	 = (1 + ) > 0:
Regulated output* (2.2) Z = 	

1  2
1 2
1 Q

 =ZU(
QR
QU
)

 :
Revenue of rm 1* (2.3) R1 = K1Q; where K1 = (

2
)	

1  2
(1 2)
1  :
Cons surp in ctry 1*(2.4) V1 = K2R1; where K2 = 2
1 

:
Firm 1s costs* (2.5) C1 = K3R1   bQ1; where K3 =  1+2 :
Welf in country 1* (2.6) W = V1 +R1   C1 = (1 +K2  K3)K1Q   bQ1:
maximised when*(2.7) Q1 F = [K2 + 1 K3]K1b :
Global welfare* (2.8) WG = V1 + 2R1   2C1 = (1 + 2K2   2K3)K1QG   2bQ1G:
maximised when* (2.9) Q1 G = [
K2
2
+ 1 K3]K1b :
A rm exits when* (2.10) (1 +K2  K3)K1Q0   bQ0 = 0 =) Q1 0 = (1 K3)K1b :
*quality is regulated
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2. Numerical solutions of national treatment and
mutual recognition in a monopoly case
Changes in welfare are calculated as proportions of total global welfare in the
globally optimum standards case. Two sets of scenarios are looked at: rst, where
standards are exible across the two countries, and secondly where standards are
inexible.
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Table A2.1 National treatment compared to mutual recognition with flexible standards: exporting
country
Per cent
β 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
η
0.1 -1.8 -2.1 -2.6 -3.1 -3.6 -4.3 -5.1 -6.0 -7.2
0.2 -3.3 -4.0 -4.7 -5.5 -6.5 -7.7 -9.1 -10.8 -13.1
0.3 -4.7 -5.5 -6.4 -7.5 -8.8 -10.4 -12.3 -14.7 -17.8
0.4 -5.9 -6.8 -7.8 -9.1 -10.5 -12.4 -14.7 -17.6 -21.6
0.5 -7.0 -7.9 -8.9 -10.2 -11.8 -13.8 -16.3 -19.7 -24.5
0.6 -7.9 -8.7 -9.7 -11.0 -12.5 -14.5 -17.2 -20.9 -26.4
0.7 -8.8 -9.5 -10.3 -11.4 -12.8 -14.7 -17.2 -21.0 -27.2
0.8 -9.5 -10.0 -10.7 -11.5 -12.6 -14.1 -16.4 -19.9 -26.4
0.9 -10.1 -10.4 -10.8 -11.2 -11.9 -12.8 -14.3 -16.8 -22.5
Table A2.2 National treatment compared to mutual recognition with flexible standards: importing
country
Per cent
β 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
η
0.1 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.6 2.1 1.4
0.2 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.1 5.9 5.5 4.9 4.0 2.7
0.3 8.6 8.7 8.7 8.6 8.3 7.8 7.0 5.8 3.9
0.4 10.7 10.8 10.8 10.7 10.4 9.9 9.0 7.5 5.2
0.5 12.6 12.7 12.8 12.7 12.4 11.8 10.9 9.3 6.5
0.6 14.4 14.4 14.5 14.4 14.2 13.7 12.8 11.2 8.1
0.7 15.9 16.0 16.0 16.0 15.8 15.5 14.8 13.3 10.0
0.8 17.3 17.3 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.2 16.7 15.6 12.6
0.9 18.5 18.6 18.6 18.7 18.7 18.7 18.6 18.1 16.2
Table A2.3 National treatment compared to mutual recognition with flexible standards: both countries
Per cent
β 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
η
0.1 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.2 -0.5 -1.3 -2.4 -3.9 -5.8
0.2 2.8 2.2 1.5 0.6 -0.6 -2.2 -4.2 -6.8 -10.4
0.3 3.9 3.2 2.3 1.0 -0.5 -2.6 -5.3 -8.9 -13.9
0.4 4.8 4.0 3.0 1.7 -0.1 -2.5 -5.7 -10.1 -16.4
0.5 5.7 4.9 3.8 2.5 0.6 -1.9 -5.4 -10.4 -18.0
0.6 6.4 5.7 4.7 3.4 1.7 -0.8 -4.4 -9.7 -18.3
0.7 7.1 6.5 5.7 4.6 3.1 0.8 -2.5 -7.8 -17.2
0.8 7.8 7.3 6.7 5.9 4.8 3.1 0.4 -4.3 -13.8
0.9 8.4 8.2 7.9 7.4 6.8 5.8 4.3 1.2 -6.3
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Table A2.4 National treatment compared to mutual recognition with inflexible standards: exporting
country
Per cent.
β 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
η
10% -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4
20% -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8
30% -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.9 -1.0 -1.2
40% -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -1.0 -1.1 -1.3
50% -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.9 -1.0 -1.1
60% -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
70% 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
80% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
90% -2.1 -2.2 -2.3 -2.4 -2.5 -2.7 -2.9 -3.4 -4.4
Table A2.5 National treatment compared to mutual recognition with inflexible standards: importing
country
Per cent
β 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
η
10% 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5
20% 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.0
30% 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.3
40% 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.2 1.6
50% 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.4 1.7
60% 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.1 1.5
70% 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.0
80% 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.3
90% 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.0 7.2
Table A2.6 National treatment compared to mutual recognition with inflexible standards: both countries
Per cent
β 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
η
10% 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.1
20% 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.1
30% 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.3 0.8 0.2
40% 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.6 1.1 0.4
50% 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.4 0.7
60% 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.5 0.9
70% 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.8
80% 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.3
90% 6.1 6.0 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.6 5.2 4.6 2.8
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